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ABSTRACT 
Most studies on the impacts of agriculture on the environment have devoted efforts to 
measure the environmental impacts of the sector rather than to assess its ability to reduce or 
mitigate such impacts. Some have addressed the environmental efficiency of the sector 
(Reinhard, et al., 1999, Ball et al., 1994 and 2004; Rezek and Perrin, 2004 and Serra et al., 
2011) but only few have examined greenhouse gas emissions (Njuki and Bravo-Ureta, 2015; 
Dakpo, Jeanneaux and Latruffe, 2016) from the sector. This paper analyzes the agricultural 
performance of states in the U.S. in terms of their ability to reduce emissions of methane and 
nitrous oxide, two major greenhouse gases (GHGs) with important global warming potential. 
The analysis evaluates Färe’s PAC (pollution abatement cost) for each state and year, a measure 
of the opportunity costs of subjecting the sector to GHG emissions regulation. Using both 
hyperbolic and directional distance functions to specify the technology with good and bad 
outputs, we find that such regulations might reduce output by an average of about 2%, though 
the results for individual states vary quite widely. 
 





The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that as of 2010, 
agriculture accounted for 24% global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, versus 
21% from industry and 14% from transportation (IPCC, 2014). In the U.S. in 2013, agriculture 
accounted for approximately 9% of GHG emissions. Since 1990, agricultural emissions had 
increased by approximately 17%, the main driver being the 54% growth in combined 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions (EPA, 2015). It is worth noting that the global warming 
potential of methane and nitrous oxide are respectively 21 and 310 times that of carbon dioxide 
(EPA, 2010). Methane has a 12 year and nitrous oxide a 114-year lifespan in the atmosphere. 
Nitrous oxide is also one of the leading ozone depleting substances.  These environmental 
impacts have made the agricultural sector a target of several federal and state regulatory efforts: 
the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, the Safe Climate Act of 
2006, the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, the Clean Power Plan of 2015, and 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives, among others.  The 2010 EPA proposals, Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, prompted stationary 
sources, agricultural production units included, to obtain permits if actual emissions or potential 
to emit go beyond certain established thresholds1.  GHG emissions have been addressed not only 
by regulations but also by voluntary strategies as the joint biogas opportunities roadmap under 
President’s Obama Climate Action Plan which targeted to cut greenhouse gas emissions from 
the dairy sector by 25 percent by 2020. The latest proposal is The Energy and Innovation and 
 
1 At least 75,000 tons per year (tpy) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) and an increase in emissions of at least 
one non-GHG pollutant as of January 2, 2011 on a first step. And at least 100,000 tpy CO2e as of July 11, 2011 as 
second step. Source emissions below 50,000 tpy CO2e, and no modification resulting in net GHG increases of 
less than 50,000 tpy CO2e, would be subject to PSD or title V permitting as of April 30, 2016. 
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Carbon Dividend Act introduced in 2018 and reintroduced in Congress in 2019 that proposes a 
carbon fee at the source and dividends redistributed across the population. 
While many of these regulatory initiatives were put on hold with the advent of President 
Trump’s administration, the interest in reducing GHGs will no doubt continue, including interest 
in reducing GHG emissions from the agriculture sector. The unique perspective of the present 
research is relevant to this interest, given our estimate of the opportunity cost of compliance with 
potential regulation.  
The first section of this paper presents a brief literature review, the second describes our 
approach, then data and results are discussed. 
 
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT	
To measure environmental performance accounting for undesirable outputs in a 
production process, a number of economic tools have been employed. Both non-parametric data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic as well as deterministic parametric distance 
functions have been used to represent feasible technologies and thereby assess the performance 
of decision-making units (DMUs). Pittman (1983) introduced a multilateral productivity index 
to account for undesirable outputs in paper manufacturing.  Extending that work, Färe et al. 
(1989) developed an enhanced hyperbolic efficiency measure that examines the potential for a 
given DMU to simultaneously and equi-proportionally expand desirable outputs and contract 
undesirable outputs and inputs. Later, Chambers, Färe and Grosskopf (1996) introduced a 
directional distance function which relaxes the need for equi-proportional expansion of 
desirables and undesirables.  Färe, Grosskopf, Noh and Weber (2005) use it in both a stochastic 
and a deterministic environment considering electricity as a desirable output and SO2 emissions 
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as undesirable output. Directional distance functions have also been used in non-parametric 
indexes of temporal environmental performance by a number of authors2.  Coelli et al. (2007) 
developed an approach that incorporates the materials balance concept into a production model. 
In all these approaches the distance between an observed production plan and the best practice 
frontier is interpreted as technical inefficiency. Because the DEA approach is deterministic, it 
fails to account for data noise making it very sensitive to outliers. (Coelli and Perelman, 2000).  
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) address this by considering a stochastic production frontier 
to describe the feasible technology, adding stochastic components to represent both random 
deviations and individual DMU inefficiency. Reinhard et al. (1999 and 2002) and Cuesta et al. 
(2009) combined the stochastic frontier approach with the consideration of undesirable outputs. 
The majority of studies using these approaches that consider undesirable outputs have 
been applied to the manufacturing sector.  But there have been applications in agriculture:  Ball 
et al. (1994, 2004) for U.S. agriculture versus excess nitrogen, Rezek and Perrin (2004) for 
agriculture in the Great Plains versus excess nitrogen and pesticide runoff, Ball, Grosskopf and 
Weber (2006) for U.S. agricultural output versus water pollution, Coelli et al. (2007) for pig 
production versus phosphorous emissions in Belgium, Reinhard et al. (1999) for Dutch dairy 
farms versus nitrogen surplus, Nin-Pratt (2013) for the world livestock versus nitrogen surplus, 
Njuki and Bravo-Ureta (2015) for U.S. dairy sector versus greenhouse gasses, and 
Dakpo, Jeanneaux and Latruffe (2016) for French sheep production versus GHGs. Our study 
considers methane and nitrous oxide from both livestock and crops, using state level data from 
the 48 contiguous U.S. states.    
 
2 Directional distance functions have been used in the Luenberger productivity indicator (Chambers, 1996), and 




APPROACHES IN THIS STUDY	
This study examines the efficiency of individual U.S. states with respect to their production 
of livestock, crops and greenhouse gases (GHGs).  We use non-parametric data envelopment 
techniques (hyperbolic and directional output distance functions) to identify the feasible 
technology and measure the potential decrease in GHG emissions of the individual states.  We 
postulate a state-level agricultural production technology, T, that transforms inputs 𝑥 ∈ ℝ!" into 
desirable outputs 𝑦 ∈ ℝ!# and weakly disposable undesirable outputs	𝑏 ∈ ℝ!
$  such that 	𝑇 =
{(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) ∶ 𝑥	𝑐𝑎𝑛	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒(𝑦, 𝑏)	}. Alternatively, the technology can be characterized by the 
compact output set as	𝑃%(𝑥) = {(𝑦, 𝑏): (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑇	}, satisfying the axioms of null jointness in 
desirable and undesirable outputs, weak disposability in undesirable outputs and strong 
disposability in desirable outputs.  
 
Hyperbolic efficiency measures 
The enhanced hyperbolic productive efficiency measure used here follows Färe et al. 
(1989). It measures for each individual decision-making unit (DMU – states in our case) the 
potential for equi-proportional expansion of desirable outputs and contraction of undesirable 
outputs as well as inputs, given the feasible production technology revealed by the set of 48 
states. In Figure 1 the vertices A and B represent combinations of bad and good output achieved 
by two DMUs on the frontier, while (bk,yk) represents that for DMU k, whose efficiency we 
examine in this figure. Assuming weak disposability of environmentally undesirable outputs, the 
hyperbolic output efficiency measure for state k, representing the potential for simultaneous and 
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equi-proportional expansion in desirable outputs and contraction in undesirable outputs and 
inputs is defined as follows:   




If instead of weak disposability in undesirable outputs we were to impose strong 
disposability (i.e., it does not cost anything to dispose of these outputs), the measure is	 
	
𝐻𝐸)(𝒙& , 𝒚& , 𝒃&) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥{(𝜆			: 	𝜆𝒚& , 	𝜆'(𝒃, 𝜆'(𝒙&)	 ∈ 	𝑃)(𝒙)}		 				(2) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates these two measures for DMU k, where the feasible weakly disposable 
technology is represented by the convex solid projection curve shown, and the feasible strongly 
disposable technology is illustrated by the continuing dashed projection to the level of maximum 
producible output y*. When b is strongly disposable, the DMU can produce at the maximum y* 
whatever level of b, then simply dispose of all the b, providing an effective output combination 
on the vertical axis at lsyk = y*.  A DMU is efficient if it is on the frontier, and in this case, 
HE(𝒙& , 𝒚& , 𝒃&) = 1. It is inefficient when	𝐻𝐸(𝒙& , 𝒚& , 𝒃&) > 1. In this study we use Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to calculate these measures. The programming algorithms are 
shown in Appendix 1. 
 
PAC – a measure of pollution abatement cost 
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 Färe, et al., (1989) proposed, in the context of hyperbolic efficiency, that the ratio of the 
efficiency measures under strong disposability (ls) and weak disposability (lw) is a “measure of 
the regulatory impact, conceived in terms of reduced productivity due to a forced departure from 
strong disposability of undesirable outputs.” or of the cost to that DMU of being unable to freely 
dispose of the bad.  Färe, et al. (2007) subsequently named this ratio PAC (pollution abatement 
cost), and it has been used in a number of applications (Färe, et al. 2016; Liu and Sumaila, 2016). 
The logic of PAC as a measure of pollution abatement cost is as follows. Consider the 
projection of DMU k from (bk, yk) to the weakly disposable technology frontier at (bk/lw=b1, 
lwyk=y1), as indicated in Figure 1. If b were freely disposable, the now efficient DMU could 
increase y to the point of maximum desirable output, y*, then dispose of all the b. But y* is equal 
to lsyk, the point on the frontier to which we have projected the DMU using 𝐻𝐸) under strong 
disposability.  The ratio ls /lw is thus equal to the ratio y*/y1, the ratio of the amount of good 
output the DMU could produce under free disposability, relative to the good output at the 
efficient point on the weakly disposable frontier to which it is hyperbolically projected.   
 Our reservation with respect to this interpretation is that it is measured from the point on 
the weak disposability frontier to which we project the state.  The projection path in general is 
purely arbitrary – it could be projected along any number of other paths, as we suggest in the 
next section, rather than a hyperbolic projection.  There is no particular reason for us to believe 
that if the DMU were to become technically efficient, it would perform at the projected point, 
and it is highly unlikely that any conceivable regulatory policy would cause the agricultural 
DMU to move to that particular projection point.  Still, there is intuitive appeal and precedent 
for interpreting the ratio as potential regulatory impact such that a binding regulation on DMU k 
results in  𝜆)/𝜆% > 1	 and in 𝜆)/𝜆% = 1 in the absence of regulation (or in production of y1 
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versus the y* that would be produced in the absence of regulation, where y*/y1 =  𝜆)/𝜆%).  Rather 
than to follow Färe by defining PAC as the ratio 𝜆)/𝜆%, we define PAC as the difference, 𝜆) −
𝜆%, which we then multiply by the dollar-valued yk to measure the dollar value of the PAC. 
Accordingly, a measure of the cost of regulation, or the cost of being unable to dispose of the 
bad output freely, can be approximated by equation (3).  We interpret this as the hyperbolic 
pollution abatement cost (PAC) in this study:  
 
𝑃𝐴𝐶*+& =	𝒚𝒌	 ∗ [𝐻𝐸)(𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&) − 𝐻𝐸%(𝒙& , 𝒚& , 𝒃&)	]  	 				(3) 
 
 
A Directional Output Efficiency Measure  
Generalization of the output distance function has led to consideration of the directional 
output distance function to measure efficiency, which is suitable and convenient for gauging 
performance of a production process with both desirable and undesirable outputs.  Performance 
measures associated with the directional distance function include a number of nonparametric 
and nonstochastic indexes (Chambers, 1996; Chung et al., 1997; Oh, 2010; Oh and Heshmati, 
2011) as well as parametric, deterministic and stochastic, approaches (Silva et al., 2019; Badau 
et al. 2016; Summary and Weber, 2012; Färe et al. 2007; Färe et al, 2009).  In this study we use 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to obtain the directional output distance function to assess 
efficiency in the presence of GHG emissions conceptualized as a bad output.  
The directional output distance function also measures efficiency by projecting 
individual DMU observations to the technology frontier, but along a chosen ray from its 
observed point rather than along a hyperbolic path, as illustrated in Figure 2 and described next.  
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This efficiency measure is defined as the maximum feasible multiple, 𝛽, of additional output 
units and subtraction of input units given a directional vector 𝒈 = O𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒙P, which identifies the 
units of y and x, respectively:	 
 
𝐷R⃗& O𝒚& , 𝒙&; 𝑔0 , 𝑔1P = 𝑆𝑢𝑝[𝛽: (𝒚& + 𝛽𝒈𝒚, 𝒙&−𝛽𝒈𝒙) ∈ 𝑃(𝒙)] , 								(4) 
 
which is referred to as a directional distance function3. In the context of a joint production 
process of undesirable and desirable outputs, an environmental directional distance function 
(𝑫RR⃗ 𝑬𝒕 ) can be defined similarly as follows: 
 
𝐷R⃗+&O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P = 𝑆𝑢𝑝[𝛽: (𝒚& + 𝛽𝒈𝒚, 𝒃& − 𝛽𝒈𝒃, 𝒙& − 𝛽𝒈𝒙) ∈ 𝑃(𝒙)]  (5) 
 
where 𝒈 = O𝒈𝒚, −𝒈𝒃, −𝒈𝒙P	is a vector determining the direction in which the desirable output 
is expanded and the inputs and undesirable outputs are contracted. The directional distance 
function also differs from the hyperbolic distance function by its additive, rather than 
multiplicative, scaling. 𝐷R⃗+&O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P	as defined in equation (5) can be computed 
by solving the linear programming problem in Appendix 1. A DMU is said efficient in the 
O𝒈𝒙, 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃P	 direction if it is on the boundary, i.e., exhibits a	𝐷RRR⃗ +&O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P = 0. It 
is inefficient when 𝐷R⃗+&O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P > 0. As with the hyperbolic, the directional 
distance can be obtained for production sets with strong disposability as follows: 
 
3 The directional distance function satisfies the translation property, homogeneity of degree -1 in !𝒈𝒙, 𝒈𝒚$, 




𝐷R⃗+)&O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P = 𝑆𝑢𝑝[𝛽: (𝒚& + 𝛽𝒈𝒚, 𝒃& − 𝛽𝒈𝒃, 𝒙& − 𝛽𝒈𝒙) ∈ 𝑃5(𝒙)]  (6)  
 
where S indicates a strongly disposable production set.  
The choice of the directional vector is somewhat arbitrary.  If O𝑔1 , 𝑔0 , 𝑔6P	 is set 
to		(0, 1, −1)	 the directional distance function projects the observation by increasing good 
output by one unit and decreasing bad output by one unit while holding inputs constant. For 
consistency with the original Farrell efficiency measures and the Shephard distance functions, 
the observed input and output mix has been used as the directional vector4. This output 
directional distance function is depicted in Figure 2, where the directional vector  O𝑔0 , −𝑔6P 
shown in the left quadrant is added to the observed vector (𝑦& , 𝑏&) so the k-th observation is 
projected along the assigned direction to point 𝐷 = (𝑦 + 𝛽∗𝑔0 , 𝑏 − 𝛽∗𝑔6) on the boundary of 
the weakly-disposable output set, 𝑃%(𝑥). 
 
[Figure 2] 
Analogous to the case of the hyperbolic distance function, a measure of pollution abatement cost 
(PAC) for DMU k resulting from a directional distance function is computed as follows:  
 
 𝑃𝐴𝐶889& = 𝑦& ∗ ](	𝐷R +⃗5O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P 	−	𝐷R⃗+:O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P	^  (7) 
 
 
4 Alternatively, Zofio et al. (2010) propose the use of market prices as directional vector to measure economic 
inefficiency in terms of foregone profits. 
 
 11 
where S and W refer to directional distances with strong and weak disposability respectively. 
 
DATA AND RESULTS 	
Data 
In this study we examine the potential cost to the state-level agricultural sector in the 
U.S. of regulating methane and nitrous oxide emissions, using data from 1992 to 2003.  The 
agricultural outputs are multilateral indexes of crop production and livestock production 
(indexed to Alabama, 1996 equal to 1.0), while the agricultural inputs are similar multilateral 
indexes of capital, land, labor, energy, chemical, pesticides and fertilizers. Details and 
documentation on methods to compute these indexes can be found in the USDA ERS 
Agricultural Productivity website. We also used the implicit quantity of livestock and crop from 
the same source to determine a dollar value of a potential emissions’ regulation.  The undesirable 
output from agriculture is from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), reported in their 
website5. We converted the EPA estimates of methane and nitrous oxide emissions into CO2 
equivalents and then indexed that quantity to Alabama 1996 = 1 for compatibility with the USDA 






5 United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), 2010. Inventory of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 
and sinks: 1990-2008. Washington D.C. 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/508_Complete_GHG_1990_2008.pdf.  Accessed 





In Table 2 we compare annual average values of PAC using hyperbolic projections versus 
directional distance function projections, along with the average values of efficiencies under 
strong versus weak disposability used to calculate these PACs.  Looking first at the average value 
across years and states (last line), we see that the average PACs are 0.020 using the hyperbolic 
projection versus 0.016 using the directional distance function projection. This indicates that the 
potential regulatory burden is about 1.6-2.0% of the value of agricultural output.   
[Table 2] 
The results indicate a strong increase in PACs from 1992 to 1995 (from 0.8% to 3.7%), 
settling back to quite constant levels around 1.5% to 2.1% from 1996-2003.  This pattern holds 
for both the hyperbolic and directional distance function specifications of technology. The results 
translated into dollar values are shown in Table 3.  The average costs over time are in the vicinity 




Broken out by crops versus livestock in Table 4, we still observe the substantial 
agreement between the two projection methods and quite similar patterns through time for the 
livestock and crop sectors, rising from 1992 to 1995 before settling to more year-to-year stability 
afterward.  Clearly however, the pollution abatement costs fluctuate more widely for livestock 
products than for crops. 
[Table 4] 
 
Appendix Table A2.1 reports PACs for individual states.  Whereas the overall average 
hyperbolic PAC is .020 (2% of output), averages for individual states range from 0.0 for eight 
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states to 0.125 for Delaware.  The overall average directional distance function PAC is 0.016, 
while averages for individual states range from 0.00 to 11.5 for Delaware.  States with high 
PACs tend to be those with high ratios of livestock to crop production such as Alabama, Georgia, 
Maryland, South Carolina and Delaware.   
What about the eight states with an average PAC of 0.0? Nominally, a PAC of zero 
indicates that if the state could operate with full efficiency on the frontier to which it was 
projected that year (only New Hampshire achieved a point actually on the frontier in every one 
of the 12 years), no output need be sacrificed due to a forced departure from free disposability 
of the polluting outputs.  Geometrically, this implies that the weakly disposable frontier and the 
strongly disposable frontier coincide at the point to which the state is projected.  Referencing 
Figure 1, the frontiers coincide at B, so the distance of the projection is the same to the two 
frontiers, and thus 𝜆) − 𝜆% = 0.     
The average state-level pollution abatement costs, expressed in 1996 dollars (Table 
A2.2), we obtain by multiplying the PAC (measured in fraction of output) times the value of 
output.  Results are similar in pattern across states to the PACs themselves. However, the 
rankings of states by total cost of pollution abatement can be quite different from rankings by 
PAC, simply because of differences in the sizes of the agricultural sectors. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This study measures the potential regulatory cost, at the level of states in the U.S., if 
agricultural methane and nitrous oxide had been regulated, for each year from 1992 to 2003. We 
obtain these measures using established non-parametric DEA methods of analyzing and 
interpreting production sets for an industry that produces undesirable outputs.  Our state-level 
 
 14 
agricultural input and output data are from ERS, USDA, while state-level data on agricultural 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide were obtained from EPA.  
This is the first study to examine, at the state level, the relationship between desirable 
agricultural outputs (crops and livestock products), methane and nitrous oxide output, and 
agricultural inputs to obtain pollution abatement cost, PAC, pioneered and applied by Färe and 
co-authors.  This PAC measure is the common multiple by which the desirable outputs of a 
decision-making unit (DMU) could be increased measured from a point on the technology 
boundary to which the DMU is projected if it is not already on the boundary.  This multiple 
represents the additional desirable output that a DMU could achieve if the undesirable output 
were freely disposable, compared to the output it could obtain if it could not dispose of the 
undesirable output without a cost.  It has thus been argued to be a plausible upper bound on the 
potential cost of regulating the undesirable output. 
We use two alternative methods to project DMUs (states in our case) to the technological 
boundary defined by observations on all 48 states. The first method uses the enhanced hyperbolic 
efficiency (HE) trajectory, while the second method uses directional distance functions (DDF) 
for the same purpose.  
 Our results indicate that the average annual pollution abatement cost (PAC), across all 
states and years, is 0.019 (1.95%, or $49 million) using the hyperbolic projection, or 0.0163 
(1.63% or $57 million) using the DDF projection.  While these seem to be relatively small 
penalties, at the state level the PACs range from $0 for eight states to as much as $200 million 
per year for Georgia and around $200 million each for North Carolina and Minnesota.   
 Given the data and method of analysis, it is not possible for us to directly evaluate what 
factors contribute to the differences in PACs across states. The analytical method presumes that 
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any given state could achieve what any other state (or a linear combination of them) has achieved 
for given levels of inputs. Because of differences in agro-climatic conditions and related 
differences in product mix, this is not likely to be feasible. However, some of the differences in 
GHG efficiency are no doubt due to adoption and use of GHG mitigation technologies, 
environmentally friendly agricultural practices and differences in environmental regulations 
across states.  To the extent that agriculture in a state is unable to match the level of efficiency 
of other states, our PAC may underestimate the pollution abatement cost. 
Färe’s PAC measure does not specify any particular regulatory mechanism. Because of 
this it only provides us with a general notion of what the regulatory cost might be.  Clearly, 
particular regulations such as maximum permissible emissions per animal or per acre, or per 
unit of output, or regulations prescribing best management practices, may nudge producers 
toward combinations of desirable and undesirable outcomes that are postulated by the Färe 
PAC measure.  While study of those possible outcomes are surely warranted where feasible, 
the PAC estimates here provide plausible measures of the relative burdens that GHG regulation 
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Table 1.  Data Descriptive Statistics: Yearly State-Level Data on 
Agricultural Outputs and Inputs for U.S. 48 States, 1990-2004 
Variables Mean  Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
y1  Crops 2.9426 3.4521 0.0327 22.9963 
y2  Livestock 0.8655 0.7953 0.004 3.7274 
b3  Methane 3.0913 5.584 0.0051 30.3838 
b4 Nitrous Oxide 2.4751 2.4652 0.0093 12.7775 
x1  Capital 1.5736 1.3427 0.0208 6.1439 
x2  Labor 1.9615 2.1647 0.0118 13.6648 
x3  Land 1.9396 1.7162 0.0242 11.2267 
x4  Energy  1.7249 1.594 0.0153 8.3163 
x5  Chemicals 1.9772 2.0939 0.0081 9.8501 
x6  Pesticides 1.8768 1.9894 0.0045 11.5596 
x7  Fertilizer 2.0512 2.2991 0.0101 12.7621 





Table 2. Average agriculture PACs (Pollution Abatement Costs) across U.S. states, 
using hyperbolic versus directional distance function projections. 
  Using the hyperbolic projection   
Using the directional distance 
function projection 
  disposability  
PAC 
 disposability  
PAC   strong weak  strong weak 
  Eq (2) Eq (1) Eq (3)  Eq (6) Eq (5) Eq (7) 
1992 1.051 1.042 0.009  0.047 0.039 0.008 
1993 1.067 1.057 0.010  0.061 0.052 0.009 
1994 1.108 1.081 0.027  0.095 0.072 0.023 
1995 1.173 1.136 0.037  0.147 0.117 0.030 
1996 1.113 1.094 0.019  0.097 0.081 0.016 
1997 1.117 1.096 0.021  0.101 0.084 0.018 
1998 1.109 1.089 0.019  0.095 0.078 0.017 
1999 1.123 1.105 0.018  0.106 0.091 0.015 
2000 1.128 1.111 0.017  0.107 0.094 0.014 
2001 1.109 1.089 0.019  0.095 0.078 0.017 
2002 1.138 1.120 0.018  0.118 0.104 0.015 
2003 1.109 1.089 0.019  0.095 0.078 0.017 
          






Table 3. Average dollar value of 
agriculture PACs across U.S. states 
(in thousands of current dollars) 






1992         21,985          19,837  
1993         36,931          32,476  
1994         58,363          49,788  
1995         86,958          70,404  
1996         62,126          53,556  
1997         60,622          51,908  
1998         62,881          55,604  
1999         50,089          43,482  
2000         71,001          58,940  
2001         62,881          55,604  
2002         58,766          49,894  
2003         62,881          55,604  
     
 





Table 4. Average dollar value of agriculture PACs for 
livestock and crops (in thousands of current dollars) 
  Livestock production Crop production 







1992 9,397 8,479 12,588 11,358 
1993 18,095 15,730 18,836 16,745 
1994 31,313 26,292 27,050 23,496 
1995 48,249 38,219 38,709 32,185 
1996 28,567 24,223 33,559 29,332 
1997 30,989 26,037 29,633 25,871 
1998 33,036 29,095 29,845 26,509 
1999 26,704 22,695 23,385 20,787 
2000 36,475 28,965 34,526 29,975 
2001 33,036 29,095 29,845 26,509 
2002 31,229 25,809 27,537 24,085 
2003 33,036 29,095 29,845 26,509 
       








Appendix 1.  Programming problems solved 
Hyperbolic efficiency measure under weak disposability defined in equation (1) as 




Subject to  
 
∑ 𝑧&;&<( 𝑦=& ≥ λ𝑦=& 														𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀  (𝐴1. 𝑖) 
	∑ 𝑧&;&<( 𝑏>& = 𝜆𝑏>& 														𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽		 	 (𝐴1. 𝑖𝑖)	
∑ 𝑧&;&<( 𝑥?& ≤ 𝜆𝑥?& 														𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁	 	 (𝐴1. 𝑖𝑖𝑖)	
𝑧& ∈ 𝑅!; 
where where zt is an activity vector of length k used to identify the boundaries of the technology 
as linear combinations of observed points.   
For convenience in computation, we used the following linear programming where  
Γ = 𝜆@, 𝑧A = 𝜆𝑧. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥	Γ							 
∑ 𝑧&′;&<( 𝑦=& ≥ Γ𝑦=&A													𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀  (𝐴2. 𝑖) 
	∑ 𝑧&′;&<( 𝑏>& = Γ𝑏>&A																𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽	 	 (𝐴2. 𝑖𝑖)	
∑ 𝑧&′;&<( 𝑥?& ≤ Γ𝑥?&A															𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁	 	 (𝐴2. 𝑖𝑖𝑖)	
𝑧&′ ∈ 𝑅!; 
 
Under strong disposability  
𝐻𝐸5(𝑥& , 𝑦& , 𝑏&) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥{(𝜆			: 	𝜆𝑦& , 	𝜆'(𝑏& , 	𝜆'(𝑥&)	 ∈ 	𝑃)(𝑥&)}		as defined in equation (2) is 
similarly solved by replacing the equal sign in the second constraint of both problems by the 
greater than or equal sign (≤). 




𝐷R⃗+&O𝒚& , 𝒃& , 𝒙&; 𝒈𝒚, 𝒈𝒃, 𝒈𝒙P = 𝑆𝑢𝑝[𝛽: (𝒚& + 𝛽𝒈𝒚, 𝒃& − 𝛽𝒈𝒃, 𝒙& − 𝛽𝒈𝒙) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥)]   
where 𝒈 = ]𝒈𝒚, −𝒈𝒃, −𝒈𝒙^ is a vector determining the direction in which the desirable output 
is expanded and the inputs and undesirable outputs are contracted.  We compute this measure 
for each DMU by solving the following problem, assuming strong and weak disposability.  
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥		𝛽  
Subj. to:  
∑ 𝑧&;&<( 𝑦&= ≥ 𝑦&= + 𝛽𝑔0																								𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀   (A3.i) 
 ∑ 𝑧&;&<( 𝑏&> = 𝑏&> − 𝛽𝑔6																											𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽   (A3.ii) 
∑ 𝑧&;&<( 𝑥&? ≤ 𝑥&? 	− 𝛽𝑔1																											𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁   (A3.iii) 
𝑧& ≥ 0,  
 
To calculate the distance for DMU k under strong disposability, the equality on the undesirable 




 Appendix 2. Average States’ Efficiencies and PACs. 
 
Appendix Table A2.1. Hyperbolic and Directional Distance 
Function Efficiency Measures with related Potential 
Regulation Cost 
 Hyperbolic   DDF  










   
AL 1.475 1.403 0.071  0.357 0.318 0.040 
AR 1.007 1.000 0.007  0.007 0.000 0.007 
AZ 1.013 1.008 0.006  0.013 0.007 0.006 
CA 1.003 1.003 0.000  0.003 0.003 0.000 
CO 1.075 1.062 0.013  0.072 0.059 0.012 
CT 1.044 1.033 0.011  0.042 0.032 0.010 
DE 1.125 1.000 0.125  0.115 0.000 0.115 
FL 1.001 1.000 0.001  0.001 0.000 0.001 
GA 1.171 1.098 0.073  0.156 0.093 0.063 
IA 1.008 1.006 0.002  0.008 0.006 0.002 
ID 1.017 1.016 0.000  0.016 0.016 0.000 
IL 1.011 1.008 0.003  0.010 0.007 0.003 
IN 1.069 1.057 0.012  0.065 0.054 0.011 
KS 1.167 1.156 0.012  0.147 0.138 0.009 
KY 1.128 1.127 0.001  0.116 0.116 0.001 
LA 1.106 1.106 0.000  0.099 0.099 0.000 
MA 1.001 1.000 0.001  0.001 0.000 0.001 
MD 1.271 1.184 0.087  0.231 0.165 0.066 
ME 1.258 1.210 0.048  0.224 0.186 0.037 
MI 1.164 1.118 0.046  0.150 0.111 0.039 
MN 1.106 1.084 0.022  0.097 0.078 0.019 
MO 1.025 1.025 0.000  0.022 0.022 0.000 
MS 1.199 1.199 0.000  0.174 0.174 0.000 
MT 1.257 1.217 0.040  0.220 0.189 0.031 





Appendix Table A2.1 … continued 
NC 1.032 1.009 0.023  0.031 0.009 0.022 
ND 1.091 1.074 0.017  0.085 0.070 0.015 
NE 1.050 1.048 0.002  0.047 0.045 0.002 
NH 1.000 1.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
NJ 1.017 1.000 0.017  0.016 0.000 0.016 
NM 1.051 1.032 0.019  0.048 0.030 0.017 
NV 1.003 1.003 0.000  0.003 0.003 0.000 
NY 1.036 1.036 0.000  0.034 0.034 0.000 
OH 1.082 1.061 0.021  0.077 0.057 0.019 
OK 1.461 1.458 0.003  0.356 0.355 0.001 
OR 1.045 1.020 0.025  0.042 0.019 0.023 
PA 1.183 1.171 0.012  0.162 0.152 0.011 
RI 1.006 1.000 0.006  0.006 0.000 0.006 
SC 1.252 1.158 0.093  0.219 0.145 0.074 
SD 1.117 1.102 0.015  0.108 0.094 0.013 
TN 1.165 1.165 0.000  0.148 0.148 0.000 
TX 1.421 1.420 0.001  0.332 0.332 0.001 
UT 1.049 1.047 0.003  0.047 0.044 0.002 
VA 1.309 1.304 0.005  0.260 0.257 0.003 
VT 1.031 1.025 0.006  0.029 0.024 0.005 
WA 1.014 1.001 0.014  0.014 0.001 0.013 
WI 1.186 1.174 0.012  0.166 0.155 0.011 
WV 1.159 1.094 0.065  0.139 0.087 0.052 
WY 1.043 1.042 0.001  0.040 0.039 0.001 




Appendix Table A2.2.  Potential Agricultural GHG Regulation Cost (in 1996 $) 
 Livestock  Crops 
 Hyperbolic DDF  Hyperbolic DDF 
 
States 
   
 
   
AL          176,715             97,954              56,922             32,044  
AR           22,945             21,952              17,044             16,306  
AZ             4,776               4,570                6,408               6,131  
CA                  -                      -                       -                     -    
CO           33,165             30,360              22,957             21,040  
CT             2,423               2,245                2,417               2,253  
DE           77,657             71,160              22,873             20,999  
FL             1,349               1,338                5,358               5,314  
GA          250,333            216,628             156,433           135,471  
IA           12,109             11,641              16,366             15,746  
ID                428                  420                   570                 559  
IL             6,063               5,841              24,674             23,932  
IN           24,168             22,329              46,425             42,945  
KS           48,938             39,405              46,999             38,550  
KY             1,275               1,197                1,644               1,560  
LA                  -                      -                       -                     -    
MA                126                  125                   256                 254  
MD           82,281             63,004              49,479             38,112  
ME           15,054             11,660              10,066               7,891  
MI           72,778             61,442             139,151           117,806  
MN           94,223             83,880             127,585           115,258  
MO                  -                      -                       -                     -    
MS                  -                      -                       -                     -    
MT           29,508             23,245              51,111             40,680  
NC          109,325            105,263              66,263             63,844  
ND             9,673               8,804              56,984             51,894  
NE           10,463               9,701              12,215             11,330  
NH                  -                      -                       -                     -    
NJ             3,741               3,659                9,323               9,123  
NM           22,493             20,248                8,591               7,731  
NV                  -                      -                       -                     -    
NY                  -                      -                       -                     -    
OH           41,978             39,100              71,408             66,718  
OK             5,803               3,234                3,161               1,781  
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OR           18,365             17,097              51,615             48,163  
PA           33,817             31,254              21,439             19,832  
RI                 75                   73                   172                 169  
SC           75,797             60,186              79,177             63,128  
SD           23,372             20,865              44,582             40,264  
TN                  -                      -                       -                     -    
TX             6,161               3,859                4,480               2,810  
UT             1,627               1,475                   947                 857  
VA             7,306               5,350                5,088               3,731  
VT             2,708               2,405                   702                 624  
WA           21,517             21,033              49,322             48,223  
WI           55,032             49,158              31,790             28,485  
WV           22,729             18,271              10,059               8,103  
WY                538                  500                   309                 287  
Average           29,767             24,832              27,758             24,166  
  
